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CHARTER SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD
Derek W. Black*

INTRODUCTION

The number of charter schools has exploded over the past two
decades. The first charter school was opened in 1992, and, at the
time, only two states in the country authorized their creation.'
Within five years, over half of the states authorized charter schools,
and the number in operation grew exponentially. 2 Today, all but ten
states authorize charter schools, over five thousand charter schools
are in operation, 3 and nearly two million children attend them. 4
Both state and federal programs have strongly encouraged this
growth.6
Due to initial concerns over their constitutionality,
vouchers have not yet experienced the same level of ascendency, but
with legal uncertainties more recently resolved,6 calls to expand
vouchers are becoming frequent.7
In the rush to expand charters, and now vouchers, surprisingly
scant attention has been paid to issues of educational mission and

* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would
like to thank Omari Simmons for thinking of me when he began planning this
symposium and for delivering an excellent event. I would also like to thank
Dean Blake Morant and all the members of the Wake Forest Law Review for all
the resources and support they put behind the symposium. I was impressed at
every turn. Finally, I owe thanks to Zoe Miller for her invaluable comments on
the prior draft of this Essay and to Tommy Croker and Danielle Holley-Walker
for their help in constructing my initial working thesis.
1. U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUc., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS
PROGRAM: YEAR ONE EVALUATION REPORT 3-4 (2000).
2. Id. at iii.
3. NATL ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., BACK TO SCHOOL TALLIES:
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS & STUDENTS, 2011-2012, at 12 (2011), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/Publicationdocs
INAPCS%202011-12%2ONew%20and%20Closed%20Charter%20Schools
20111206T125251.pdf.

4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Educ., States Open to Charters
Start Fast in 'Race to Top': Education Secretary Seeking Autonomy with Real
Accountability for School Innovators (June 8, 2009), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/06082009a.html.
6. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

7. See Sean Cavanagh, For Democrats, Some Nuance on Vouchers, 32
EDUC. WK., Sept. 19, 2012, at 1.
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values. The dominant conversation has been whether charters and
vouchers can provide better educational outcomes, 8 but "better" is
largely conceptualized as higher test scores. Putting aside the
contentious issue of whether charters or vouchers actually improve
student achievement, "better" means better for students who take
part in those options, not better for the overall education system.
Glossing over these types of questions is glossing over fundamental
questions of the public good in education. In effect, proposals to
expand charters or vouchers tend to assume, without examination,
that they will promote the public good. But a key, if not the
primary, question in any structural change to education must be
whether it serves the public good.
The "public good" in education is, of course, susceptible to
varying interpretation, and the concept has been undergoing change
in recent years as a result of cultural and legal shifts. The public's
concept of a good education is seemingly devolving toward education
as a service or commodity, indistinct from any other service or
commodity that the government or private industry might provide.
Much of the commodification of education is spurred by the federal
focus on standardized scores.9 By reducing education policy to test
scores, federal legislation suggests that little other than the end
Social science, albeit often innocently,
result is relevant.1 0
intensifies this phenomenon, as it uses ample government data on
test scores to compare schools and program alternatives.
Reducing education to test scores, however, is only part of the
story. The commodification of education also corresponds with our
overall cultural shift toward individualized, rather than common,
experiences.1 1 In a society where one can consume any type of
entertainment and information one desires at any time of the day, it
should come as little surprise that parents and students
increasingly crave an education that caters directly to them. Today,
almost nothing is more popular in primary and secondary education
than "choice" programs that offer parents the ability to select their

8. See, generally, e.g., RON ZIMMER ET AL., RAND CORP., CHARTER SCHOOLS
IN EIGHT STATES: EFFECTS ON ACHIEVEMENT, ATTAINMENT, INTEGRATION, AND
COMPETITION (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/monographs/2009/RANDMG869.sum.pdf.
9. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006).
10. See generally Jennifer Mueller, Facing the Unhappy Day: Three Aspects
of the High Stakes Testing Movement, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201, 201-02
(2002) (outlining the focus on high-stakes testing in the No Child Left Behind
Act).
11. See, e.g., John A. Powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School
Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 679 ("The way that we discuss choice
assumes educational resources are commodities. As a commodity, education
can be bought; this is manifested in the choice paradigm . . . .").
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child's school.12
The desire for these programs often drives
education policy as much as sound pedagogy.
Increasingly forgotten in these conversations is that the purpose
of receiving an education, at least a public education, goes far
beyond the teaching of information and skills and the interests of
individual students. Public education includes the transmission of
social values that lead to social cohesion and the overall betterment
of society.13 Test scores tell us nothing of these values, and private
markets are ill suited to deliver them.14 Whereas private markets
respond to consumer preferences, public education seeks to create
public preferences. Additionally, given the nature of the democratic
values our public education seeks to promote, individually
responsive education makes little sense. Public education entails
the provision of common experiences under conditions consistent
with equal protection, due process, free speech, and religious
neutrality.
A consumer-based system allows for too much
educational variation and opens the door to individual biases that
are contrary to public education.' 5
Based on their track record thus far, charters and vouchers, on
the whole, are not operating in furtherance of the public good.
Rather than promote the public good, they tend to promote the
individual good and operate in ways that actively undermine the
public good.' 6 This Essay's purpose, however, is not to throw
charters or vouchers under the bus. Charters, in particular, are not
inherently antithetical to the public good. With sufficient oversight
and value-based limits, charters can carry out the public mission in
much the same way as traditional public schools but with the added
benefit of pedagogical, curricular, and other legitimate alternatives
to traditional public schools. For instance, charters may have the
capacity to produce integration in places where it is otherwise
impracticable. Vouchers may do the same. Yet, the possibility of
achieving the public good is insufficient. If charters and vouchers
are to be part of the public education system, we must require that
they operate consistently with the public good.

12. See generally Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature
and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY:
POLITICs, POLICY, AND LAW 13 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999).
13. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
14. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C) (requiring assessments only in
mathematics, language arts, and science); see also Martha Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229,
1246-48 (2003) (questioning the private sector's willingness to abide by
constitutional norms).
15. See, e.g., infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
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This Essay begins with a discussion of the competing theoretical
conceptions of the public good in education: maximization of
individual good-which in sum produces a group good-versus
collective good-which requires group goals. While these concepts of
the public good compete, they are not mutually exclusive in all
respects. Relying on practical examples and social science, Part II
explores both the practical tensions and the overlap between these
concepts, suggesting that the public good in today's public school
system is the group good. Part III further examines what it means

to be a public school promoting the public good and whether
charters are consistent with this public good. Finding that, as
currently implemented, they are inconsistent with the public good,
the Essay closes with a discussion of how charters could be modified

to serve the public good.
I. COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE PUBLIC GOOD IN EDUCATION
The current debate in education over privatization, choice,
charters, and vouchers is more appropriately understood as a
normative battle over the meaning of the public good in the context
of schools. On the one hand, the public good can be understood as
the collective good,17 which we maximize by pursuing collectivebased policies and goals.18 Individuals undoubtedly benefit from the
pursuit of the collective good, and individual fulfillment is an
important goal, but the collective good is not subordinate to the
individual good and thus may not always maximize individual
good.19 In some instances, the collective good may require that we

17. This Essay uses "collective" and "public" good in the general sense,
rather than in the economic sense. Extensive literature is devoted to what a
"public good" is in economic terms. To be a public good in economic terms, most
scholars would require that the good be "nonrivalrous" and "nonexcludable,"
respectively meaning that one person's use of one unit of the good does not
reduce the amount of the resource available to others and that individuals
cannot be excluded from using the good. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER,
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986);
Jeffrey A. Hart & Peter F. Cowhey, Theories of Collective Goods Reexamined, 30

W. POL. Q. 351, 351 (1977). Because certain aspects of education do not meet
these criteria, some would argue it is not a public good in the economic sense.

18. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process
of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 126 (2011) ("Republicanism

asserts that all governments bear a basic obligation to advance the good of their
people as a whole-res publica-rather than their own self-interest or the
factional interests of particular groups or individuals."); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1530 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985). However, there could be a pluralist form of

government that pursues work toward the small group goods.

19. See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participationin the
Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2001) (discussing the
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limit individual freedom and autonomy. 20 On the other hand, some
argue that the greatest public good occurs when everyone is
pursuing individual good because maximizing individual good
accrues to the benefit of the whole. 2 1 Per this concept, the individual
good does not sacrifice the public good but actually serves it.
Both concepts of the public good are theoretically valid. In a
world of infinite or, at least, sufficient resources, society could
maximize the potential of and cater to the desires of each and every
individual. If each person reaches his or her potential, then society
presumably would reach its maximum potential as well. 2 2 But in a
world of limited resources, pursuing the public good in schools
requires pursuing the collective good to some extent. Likewise, in a
society premised on the notion that the public good entails the
promotion of common values, collective norms and interests must
take primacy when those interests conflict with individual interests.
As a practical matter, neither our educational goals nor our
resources fit perfectly in either of these paradigms. Common sense
and experience tell us that that our education system is not one of
infinite resources. 23 And, while many of our schools need far more

dual nature of education in that it produces both public and individual
benefits).
20. The most obvious examples relate to limits on students' free speech and
behavior. The courts have recognized schools' authority to prohibit students
from engaging in certain types of speech and to exclude students from school
altogether because doing so may be necessary to maintain the overall order and
good of the school. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
266 (1988) (limiting student speech to achieve the school's curricular goals);
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986) (punishing student
speech because it was inconsistent with school values); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 582 (1975) (recognizing schools' authority to exclude students).
21. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 215-19 (1990) (arguing that individual consumer choices

will lead to better overall schools and results).
22. Maximizing the individual and collective good under this model
assumes that the individual is a rational actor capable of making resultmaximizing decisions. Several scholars cite this as a major flaw in market and
choice-based systems because many actors, due to lack of information or other
factors, do not make optimal choices. See, e.g., Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charter

Schools and Racial and Social Class Segregation: Yet Another Sorting
Machine?, in PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE VS. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS 81, 86

(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2003) (discussing targeted marketing and word-ofmouth recruitment that privileged some subgroups in charter school
enrollment).
23. See Ross WIENER & ELI PRISTOOP, How STATES SHORTCHANGE
THE DISTRICTS THAT NEED THE MOST HELP
5 (The Educ. Trust
ed.,
2006),
available at
http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files
/publications/files/FundingGap2006.pdf (documenting the fact that poorer
school districts within states receive less education funding and, in turn, poorer
schools within districts are underfunded).
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resources than they currently have, 24 it would not be fair to say that
schools are generally so starved of resources that they lack all
capacity to respond to individual needs. 26 Regardless of the
resources available to schools, the two concepts of the public good in
education may compete with one another, but education does not
require an all-or-nothing approach to either concept.
For instance, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,26 the Supreme Court
struck down a state statue that would have required all students to
attend public school and effectively put private schools out of
business. 27 The Court recognized that parents have a liberty
interest in controlling the upbringing of their children and pursuing
their individual interests in private school. 28 So long as those
private interests are not inimical to the public good, the state lacks a
legitimate basis in interfering. 29 The Court, however, in striking
what has come to be known as the "Pierce Compromise,"30 implicitly
recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in the education
of all children and thus has the authority both to compel students to
attend some school and to reasonably regulate private schools. 31 In
24. See
generally BRUCE
D.
BAKER
FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD

ET
AL.,
26 (2010),

IS

SCHOOL

available at
http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/NationaLReportCard_2010.pdff WIENER
& PRISTOOP, supra note 23, at 6.
25. In fact, federal law specifically requires schools to develop individual
education plans for students with disabilities and deliver special education
services where necessary. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1414 (2006); Burilovich v. Bd. of
Educ., 208 F.3d 560, 568-71 (6th Cir. 2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.321-24 (2012).
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
27. Id. at 530-35.
28. Id. at 534-35 ("The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").
29. Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down
a state statute prohibiting the teaching of German in school because "there
seems [to be] no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to
protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities").
30. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 15 (4th ed.
2002); William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints:A
Re-Examination of the JurisprudentialHistory of EducationalFinance Reform
Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1198 n.47 (2003); James E. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2000).

31. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 ("No question is raised concerning the power of
the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend
some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare."); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (striking
down extensive regulation of Japanese schools because the regulation, as a
whole, was "a deliberate plan to bring foreign language schools under a strict
governmental control for which the record discloses no adequate reason").
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short, the pursuit of the private interests and public good could
coexist (although sometimes one or the other wins out).32
Coexistence, however, is a far cry from complementary. Serious
theoretical tensions exist between the paradigmatic individual and
collective good in education. In fact, at the theoretical or abstract
level, the collective and individual concepts of educational public
good are, in some important respects, diametrically opposed. Most
notably, each seeks substantively different educational goals, which
leads to different educational structures and systems, methods of
delivery, outcomes, benefits, and tolerances. The following Subparts
flesh out the most salient of these differences.

A.

Goals

While both have common interests in delivering quality
education and graduating students, collective- and individual-based
concepts of the public good have different underlying animating
values and goals. First, as their categories obviously indicate, the
two are aimed at and benefit different constituencies: individuals
versus society as a whole. The primary purpose of the individualized
concept of education is to benefit the individual. 33 Society may
receive a benefit as well, but that benefit is indirect and not a
driving motivation. Under a collective concept, both the individual
and society are beneficiaries of education, and both benefits are
motivations.34 But a strong argument can be made that the primary
justification for public education is the societal interest. 35 Society
accrues significant economic, cultural, and democratic benefits from
an educated citizenry and suffers enormous costs if the general
population is educationally deficient.36 If society did not benefit, the
rationale for public funding of education would fall apart.3 7 If
education only benefits the individual or serves individual interests
over collective interests, there is little reason why society, rather

32. The coexistence, however, allowed for the possibility that, under certain
circumstances, one of the interests would trump the other entirely. The Court's
opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder is a prime example of this incompatible tension
and led to the Court entirely exempting Amish children from compulsory
education beyond middle school. 406 U.S. 205, 207, 213-14 (1972).
33. See CHRISTOPHER WINCH & JOHN GINGELL, PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION:
THE KEY CONCEPTS 126 (2d ed. 2008).
34. See EDUC. POLICIES COMM'N, THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 1-2 (1961).

35. See Fred Inglis, Education and the Good Society (2), in EDUCATION AND
THE GOOD SOCIETY 23, 23 (Fred Inglis ed., 2004).

36. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982).
37. Amy Gutmann, Can Publicly Funded Schools Legitimately Teach
Values in a Constitutional Democracy?, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

170, 175 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002).
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than the individual, should be responsible for ensuring education.3 8
Similarly, if education is primarily a self-serving endeavor for
individuals, the inability of disadvantaged individuals to obtain
education is theoretically of no more concern to society than the
inability of disadvantaged individuals to procure cable television or
drive nice cars. In short, collective-based education is motivated by
the fact that educational successes and failures pose serious societal
losses and gains, whereas an individual-based education treats
those societal effects as ancillary to the individual effects. 39
Inherent in each of these differing motivations is a distinct
conceptualization of public education. With collective motivations,
the provision of education itself serves a public interest. The state
provides education not only because individuals want or need it but
because an educated citizenry is needed for society to function in the
ways it desires. 40 Thus, public education is a public good, the
provision of which is among the primary reasons for the creation of
government. 4 1 Moreover, because education is a public good, the
state retains a significant interest in regulating and shaping it in all
respects. 42 This interest is obvious and explicit in publicly operated
schools, but as a public good, the state even retains an interest in
exercising some level of oversight of individuals who opt out of the
public system. 43 This interest leads the state to mandate that
individuals obtain a certain level of education, regardless of the

38. BURTON A. WEISBROD, EXTERNAL BENEFITS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 3
(1964) ("There seems to be a presumption that such external benefits do exist in
some form. For if they do not, then education is merely another private
consumption or investment good; and in that case why is it provided publicly?");
Gutmann, supra note 37.

39. See EDUC. POLICIES COMM'N, supra note 34, at 1-4; WEISBROD, supra
note 38, at 1-2; WINCH & GINGELL, supra note 33.

40. Ambach v. Norwick, 441

U.S.

68, 77 (1979);

AMY GUTMANN,

DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 49 (1987); John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian,

Parents Involved& The Mantle of Brown, The Shadow of Plessy, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 697-99 (2008).

41. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society.").
42. Id.
43. Compulsory education is the ultimate expression of this interest, as the
state is saying that under no circumstances will it permit someone to entirely
opt out of education. Few object to the idea of compulsory education and thus
do not see it in those terms. Instead, they focus more on the other expressions
of the state's interest in those who opt out manifested through regulation of
private and home schools.
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setting in which they receive it.44 And, if society desires the
widespread provision of this public good, the government may be the
only realistic entity that can consistently deliver it. The relative
lack of resources of many members of society and the benefit of
economies of scale make private markets unlikely candidates for the
general maintenance of education.45
An individual-based education system conceptualizes education
and its role in society far differently. Under the individual concept,
education is a commodity-albeit an extremely valuable one-to be
consumed by individuals. 46 Its value, however, does not distinguish
it from any other commodity. At best, the individual may find it
convenient for the government to regulate or support education, but
this does not render it a governmental responsibility. 4 7 In fact, an
individualized concept of education might allow for some citizens to
choose not to consume education or to consume less than other
citizens. From an individualized standpoint, this is not necessarily
problematic. 48 The ultimate decision as to the quality, quantity, and
substance of education is left to the individual.
B.

Values

The nature and importance of the values that individualized
and collective-based education systems disseminate are also
strikingly different. One of the main objectives of collective-based
education is to disseminate particular group values.4 9 In fact,
democratic and collective good theorists have emphasized that the

44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (wanting to
ensure that Amish children become productive members of society, the state
sought to force Amish children to attend high school against their wishes).
45. Some scholars note that certain communities and states, even when
banded together, lack the capacity to provide for an adequate education, and,
thus, only the larger group-the federal government-can ensure the proper
provision of education for all. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past,
Present, and Future of Equal Educational Opportunity:A Call for a New Theory
of Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 456-57 (2012); see also KARL
E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF EcONOMIcs 330 (6th ed. 2003) ("When
members of society get together to form a government, they do so to provide
themselves with goods and services that will not be provided if they act
separately.").
46. See Fennell, supra note 19, at 6-7 (discussing the consumption aspect
of education).
47. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13-15 (1959)
(formulating the theory of merit goods, which are commodities that are good for
individuals but would be underconsumed if left to the market, and including
education as a merit good).
48. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-11 (involving Amish students who did
not want to consume public education beyond middle school).
49. Kevin D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure
Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1992).
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goal of common schools is as much to inspire social values as it is
academic achievement.5 0 As Professor Kevin Brown explains:
Public schools are social institutions that cultivate America's
youth. They inculcate cultural values, including political and
social attitudes, opinions and beliefs. For example, schools
foster such values as respect for our country, tolerance for
political and religious diversity, commitment to selfsufficiency, and commitment to discharge faithfully the duties
imposed by citizenship.
Schools teach these values by
selecting and excluding the materials that teachers present to
students. They also instill values through a myriad of
administrative rules and regulations governing student and
teacher conduct. 51
In Brown v. Board of Education,5 2 the Supreme Court similarly
recognized that, in addition to preparing students for later
professional training, education "is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values,

. .

. and in helping him to

adjust normally to his environment."5 3 As such, "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." 54
Of course, succeeding in life necessarily requires some level of
adaptation to society, and thus collective- and individual-based
educations share some common ground. But the two concepts of
education diverge in the priority that they ascribe to societal values
and norms. Individual-based education is premised on freeing
individuals to seek their own good and values rather than those of
the group.55 To be clear, this does not entail individual values that
are inherently hostile to the group, but the sense of "we," which is
integral to collective values, can be diminished or lost in the
individual focus because the individual comes before the group.
Also, elevating individual interests and goals concedes the validity
of individual values, even when they significantly diverge from
society's values.5 6 On matters of opinion and critical analysis, this
may not be normatively problematic. Even the collective concept of
education would encourage free thought and individuality on

50. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Civic Minimalism, Cosmopolitanism, and
Patriotism: Where Does Democratic Education Stand in Relation to Each?, in
MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at 23, 42.
51. Brown, supra note 49, at 7-8.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Id. at 493.
54. Id.
55. MERLE CURTI, THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS 584 (1959).

56. Id. at 586-87.
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But an entirely individualized concept of
numerous topics. 5 7
education would allow students the freedom to adopt and later act
upon antisocial values, such as racial bias, gender bias, or religious
intolerance.6 8
Consider, for instance, an individual-orientated education
system that includes elements of school choice. Such a system
potentially caters to antisocial behaviors by permitting students
with shared antisocial values to choose to coalesce in particular
schools or programs. 59 Over the long term, this type of system
would undermine social cohesion and counteract the effect of social
pressures that might otherwise produce common values.60
In contrast, many of the specific values a collective-based
concept of education seeks to facilitate are those that mitigate and
limit individuals' tendency to adopt antisocial or group mindsets and
act on them. For instance, collective-based education promotes the
individual's commitment to enhancing the public sphere and
common good.
Because individuals tend toward self-interest,
collective-based education seeks to counteract the tendency toward
self-serving interests and affirmatively promote the opposite. 6'
Unsurprisingly, collective-based education can generate significant
controversy in promoting these values, as doing so only highlights
the tension between competing concepts of the public good. Some
theorists define the common good not as a society with an expansive
public sphere but one with unfettered individual liberty. 62
Collective-based education generally agrees that a core set of
individual liberties must be protected, but collective education limits
individualism at the point that it seriously threatens group
interests.
This is not to say that collective-based education would deny
individuals the freedom to adopt antisocial values. If our First
Amendment jurisprudence teaches anything, it is that arriving at
collective wisdom requires us to protect all individual's ideas,
regardless of how repugnant we might find those ideas. 63 And the

57. Gutmann, supra note 50, at 25-26 (describing democratic education as
designed to deliver the skill of deliberation).
58. Gutmann, supra note 37, at 172.
59. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why
Democratic Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at 87, 104-06 (arguing against state
domination of common values in favor of pluralistic values whereby religious
dissenters, for instance, could control their own education).
60. Id.
61. CURTI, supra note 55, at 589.
62. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 2-3 (1998).
63. See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-52
(1988) (summarizing Supreme Court precedent on the robust exchange of
ideas).
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Court has held that the same principles extend to public schools. 64
Protecting individual freedom, however, is far different from
requiring the state to adopt policies and structures that might
facilitate and support antisocial values and behavior.6 5 At most, the
state is obligated to allow individuals to opt out of the public system
when their individual values are at odds with public values, but,
even then, the state can place limits on the private pursuit of
individual values when the private pursuits pose a significant threat
to societal well being.66

C.

Social Cohesion

Closely related to collective education's promotion of group
values is its delivery of a common experience to all students (which
can easily go missing from an individual-based educational
experience). 67 The purpose of a common experience is to foster
substantive commonality and social cohesion based on whatever
underlying values and goals society chooses to promote. 68 Schools,
of course, are far from the only purveyors of values; societal
influences will inevitably cause most students to adopt national core
values.69 Thus, attending a collective-based versus an individualbased school will not necessarily be determinative in the values a
student ultimately adopts, 70 but collective-based education does
deliver a different message and experience that are relevant.
The hope in collective-based education is that these common
experiences and values will result in the long-term perpetuation and
continuation of the group. Individualized education, in contrast,

64. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969).
65. Christopher L. Eisgruber, How Do Liberal Democracies Teach Values?,
in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at 58, 72, 77.
66. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-34 (1925) (arguing that
parents have a strong liberty interest in directing their children's education,
especially in light of the fact that nonpublic schools do not harm the public).
67. See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597 (1940); see
also CURTI, supra note 55, at 484; Minow, supra note 14, at 1253.
68. Minow, supra note 14, at 1253-54.
69. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 nn.2-3 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence that even Amish students are
susceptible to the same social ills as the non-Amish); see also Nancy L.
Rosenblum, Pluralism and Democratic Education: Stopping Short by Stopping
with Schools, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at 147, 16364 (discussing the limits of schools' socializing power and the role of other
institutions and forces).
70. Some data suggest that there is little, if any, difference between the
attitudes of public and private students, and, in fact, private schools may foster
slightly better civic attitudes. David E. Campbell, The Civic Side of School
Choice: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Civic Education in Public and Private Schools,
2008 BYU L. REV. 487, 509 (2008).
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does not necessarily project an end result other than selfactualization. 71 The key to group perpetuation, however, is not the
promotion of just any set of common values. Rather, group
perpetuation requires the adoption of specific group-enhancing
values, among the most notable of which are equality, inclusion, and
religious tolerance. 72
In practice, these values amount to processes that allow
individuals to fully and freely participate in education and later
democracy, both of which are necessary if collective-based education
is to maintain its desired robust public domain rather than the mere
dominance of majorities and pluralities. To be clear, these same
values and processes are important to individualized education as
well because they protect individuals' rights and serve as a check on
majorities imposing themselves.
The difference is that the
individual's primary interest in these processes is to protect the
individual, while collective-based education's interest in these
processes is to perpetuate itself and ensure the group's full
participation in democracy and education. 73
The Court summarized the rationale of a perpetuating or selfpreserving system of education in Plyler v. Doe, 74 writing:
The "American people have always regarded education and
[the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance." We have recognized "the public schools as a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government," and as the primary vehicle for
transmitting "the values on which our society rests."
"[A]s . .. pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of

education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we
are to preserve freedom and independence." And these historic
"perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists." In addition, education provides the basic tools by
which individuals might lead economically productive lives to
the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role
in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups

71. Harry Brighouse, School Vouchers, Separation of Church and State,
and PersonalAutonomy, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at
244, 255.

72. John Tomasi, Civic Education and Ethical Subservience: From Mozert
to Santa Fe and Beyond, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 37, at
193, 200-01.
73. CURTI, supra note 55, at 584-85.
74. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests.7 5
While individually motivated education ascribes to many of
these same collective values, as discussed above, individual-based
education's continued existence is not dependent on these values,
whereas the continued existence of collective-based education
largely is.
Group perpetuation requires future adherence to
collective values by a substantial portion of society. If only a
random swath of students adheres to collective values, the values
will have no operative effect.7 6 By the same token, if collective
values take root as dominant social values, the basic existence of
individualized education and potentially antisocial values will not
pose a per se threat to collective-based education. In these respects,
the perpetuation of collective-based education and values requires
substantial collective action, whereas individualized education does
not.7 7 In addition, the dominance of collective-based education, so
long as it does not prohibit individualized education, does not
threaten the mission of individualized education in the way that the
dominance of individualized education threatens the mission of
collective-based education.

D.

Competition

Competition is to individualized education what social cohesion
and group values are to collective-based education. Those favoring
an individualized concept of education argue that the absence of
competition in the traditional public school system is the weakness
that stymies its progress. 78 For them, it is the marketplace and the
competition it brings that would force schools to be responsive to
individuals. 79 In contrast, supporters of collective-based education,
even if they conceded some weakness in the current system, would
resist the notion that competition is the cure. Rather, competition,
in several respects, is antithetical to the core premises of collectivebased public education.8 0

75. Id. at 221 (citations omitted) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
76-77 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Abihgton Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
76. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD 64 (2002).

77. See id.
78. CAROL ASCHER ET
PRIVATIZATION 14-15 (1996).
79. Id.
80. See
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Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 399-400
(1998) (reasoning that public goods are antithetical to competition).
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Competition inevitably results in winners and losers. An
individualized concept of education can tolerate these results
because, after all, individuals have chosen their school or
educational program and are thus culpable in their success or
failure. 81 Moreover, in a market, individuals will soon enough have
the opportunity to make better choices and effectively punish those
schools that deliver subpar experiences. But it is hard to justify
losers under a group concept of public education-even if losers in
the short term will somehow produce a larger number of winners in
the long term. 82 First, collective-based education relies on mutually
reinforcing systems, not mutually undermining systems.8 3 Second,
collective-based
education is premised on roughly equal
opportunities across the group. 84 Uneven results pose any number
of threats to the group, including inequality, lowered social benefits,
and fissures in social cohesion.8 5
Most striking in the individualized concept of education is its
seeming lack of concern for equality. On some fundamental level,
inequality is a necessary ingredient to competition.8 6 Unequal
choices are what allow individuals to identify better education,
choose that education, and leverage those choices for the overall
improvement in the marketplace.8 7 The fact that some will make
bad choices and have access to diminished education is simply the
cost of having a system that can respond to individuals. 88
Given individualized education's preference for competition, one
might assume that as soon as competition enters the overall
81. Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of "Private Choice" for
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549, 552-60 (2002); Note, The
Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State ConstitutionalGuarantees of
EducationalQuality, 109 HARv. L. REV. 2002, 2002 (1996).
82. See, e.g., Note, supra note 81, at 2010-13 (arguing that state
constitutional rights to education would not tolerate educational failures, even
in a voucher program).

83. See id.
84. Gutmann, supra note 50, at 25.
85. See id. at 25-26.
86. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89-91 (1962) (noting that
competition requires the threat of failure and unequal results); MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 148 (1980) ("A society that
puts equality-in the sense of equality of outcome-ahead of freedom will end
up with neither equality nor freedom. ...
On the other hand, a society that
puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater
freedom and greater equality.").
87. FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 91; see FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note
86, at 170 (noting that unequal choices would raise the quality of even the worst
school in absolute, if not relative, terms).
88. See Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to be
Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1729 (2012) (explaining that for some parents a
qualitatively worse education that they choose is superior to a program outside
their regulatory power).
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education market it is to the benefit of individualized education.
While this is generally true, it is worth recognizing that a mixed
system of individual- and collective-based public education
potentially creates problems for both. A system of education
whereby individualized education is primarily delivered through
private options and only a limited number of publicly financed
individual options are available means that individualized education
is limited primarily to the affluent.8 9 Thus, in the short term, the
dominant paradigm is likely to continue to be collective-based
education. Even in the long term, individualized education will be
marginalized until public policy shifts. With that said, the longterm trajectory of education shifts heavily toward individualized
education once competition enters the system.
A mixed system, even one in which collective-based education is
currently the primary participant, draws collective-based education
into a competitive marketplace that is incompatible with certain
aspects of its mission.9 0 Consider, for instance, those who prefer the
Once the individualized system is able to
collective system.
seriously compete with the collective system, those who otherwise
prefer the collective system face a dilemma: tolerate the negative
effects that individual choices may have on the group system 91 or
reconsider the decision to remain in the group system. 92 In the
context of a public school system that uses public dollars to facilitate
individuals' choice to opt out of the group system, opting out is
overincentivized.9 3 Once a certain number of students opt out, the
rational decision, even for those who otherwise want to stay in the
group public school, may be to opt out before they feel any
The only
significant negative effects from the competition.

89. See generally Catharine V. Ewing, Constitutional Law: Vouchers,
Sectarian Schools, and ConstitutionalUncertainty:Choices for the United States
Supreme Court and the States, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 437, 439-41, 469 (2000)
(discussing vouchers as a means to give the poor the same options as others).
90. See Joe Nagel, Note, Agostini v. Felton: Separatingfrom Separation of
Church and State to Allow School Choice, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 608 (1998)
("[S]chool choice programs pit public schools against private schools in a
competition for tax dollars.").
91. State ConstitutionalLaw - Education Clause - Florida Supreme Court
Declares State's School Voucher Program Unconstitutional. - Bush v. Holmes,
919 So. 2d 392 (Fla.2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2007) (discussing how
vouchers can diminish educational quality in the schools students leave).
92. See Choice, EDUc. WK., Aug. 3, 2004, at 1 (explaining that when parents
are faced with individualized school options, they can either take advantage of
school choice or risk leaving their children in an underperforming public
school).
93. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 703-04 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the voucher system in Cleveland
incentivized students to attend religious schools that did not even correlate with
their own religious views).
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countervailing force would be the person's commitment to collective
values, but at some point self-interest will overwhelm that
commitment for most. In effect, a mixed system can create a
prisoner's dilemma that inevitably undermines collective-based
public schools.94
E.

Dissent

Competition and opt outs also raise the related problem of
empowering dissenters. Dissent, in and of itself, is not problematic.
Our democratic process thrives upon public debate and the
protection of intellectual space for dissenters. 95 But protecting space
for dissenters does not necessitate empowering the dissenter.96
Rather than strengthening democratic processes and results,
empowering the dissenter can undermine them. A democratic
process and the public policy it generates rest on the will and
wisdom of the majority (within constitutional bounds).9 7 Even in the
face of virulent dissent, the majority sets policy for the whole. While
some policies can tolerate exceptions for dissenters, most policies
require compliance by both the majority and dissent if they are to be
effective.9 8 Consider a duly enacted tax policy that allows dissenters
to opt out to some extent and the effect it would have on the overall
budget that is allocated for the benefit of all.99 For collective-based
policy to work, the absolute right of the dissenter can only be to
voice his dissent, not to act upon it.100 Even when the group has
consented to dissenting action, as with free exercise of religion, our
courts have demonstrated the infeasibility of broad action-based

94. See Gutmann, supra note 50, at 43 (noting that when children can opt
out of the public school system, the public schools are not improved but rather
the entire school system deteriorates for the students who cannot afford to opt
out).
95. See generally id. at 25-26 (discussing education as preparation for the
deliberative process of democracy).
96. See id. at 26 (indicating that democracy involves debate over mutually
binding matters).

97. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for PoliticalEquality,

77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1438-39 (1991).
98. See Gutmann, supra note 50, at 29 ("Parents do not have a general
right to override otherwise legitimate democratic decisions concerning the
schooling of their children."); Rosenblum, supra note 69, at 148-49.
99. One could argue that our tax system, with its extensive deductions that
disproportionately favor certain groups, allows for this exact sort of dissent. At
the very least, deductions effectively allow "dispersed donors to determine
which agents, projects, or causes the government will finance." Saul Levmore,
Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998).
100. "In a democracy, no one person can or should define public values."
MINOW, supra note 76, at 144; see also Rosenblum, supra note 69, at 148.
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exemptions for dissenters and have placed significant limitations on
them.101
Collective-based public education holds fast to these democratic
principles. The nature of its values and goals generally requires
collective rather than individual action. 102 An individual concept of
education, however, need not even recognize the legitimacy of
collective democratic educational judgments that conflict with
individual educational interests. 103 To counteract the potential
oppression of the majority, an individual-based education would
demand that individuals have the right not only to voice dissent but
to act upon it by opting out of the public system. To be fair, not all
dissent is equal in terms of its effect on the group. Dissent that does
not have a financial, demographic, or value effect on the group is not
necessarily problematic.1 04
But as the next Part reveals, a
significant number of dissenters do so for reasons that are
problematic for the group.
II. REAL WORLD TENSIONS IN ACHIEVING THE PUBLIC GOOD
Part I paints with an admittedly broad brush and is surely open
to theoretical caveats and retorts. But, as a practical matter, these
theoretical tensions play out in the real world of education and with
high stakes. The prevalence of individualized concepts of education
in public policy is on the rise and has led to new policies that,
consistent with the above-discussed theoretical positions, threaten
to undermine group values in education.
The most notable
examples are in regard to charters and vouchers. As currently
implemented, public policy places relatively few limits on charters'
and vouchers' ability to undermine the mission and viability of
traditional public schools and, likewise, fails to ensure educational

101. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-88
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Sossamon v.
Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). As the Court reasoned, "a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself' is anarchy. Id. at 890.
102. MINoW, supra note 76.
103. See generally Gutmann, supra note 50, at 29-30 (noting civic
minimalists' desire to limit the values taught in school so as to not invade on
the province of the family); McConnell, supra note 59, at 104-06 (rejecting
majority imposition of values on smaller groups).
104. See generally Gutmann, supra note 50, at 26-27, 36-37, 40 (discussing
the benefits of reasonable dissent and disagreement); McConnell, supra note 59,
at 106 ("The real issue is the inculcation of values ... where they conflict with
the values that would be taught [in other schools].").
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quality and fairness for those students attending charter schools or
private schools through vouchers.10 5
A.

DemographicInclusion
Various charter school and voucher programs-but not allhave worked at odds with public values related to demographic
inclusion and integration based on race, ethnicity, disability and
language status. From the outset, many voucher and charter
advocates understandably object to the charge in regard to race.
They emphasize that mandatory desegregation has largely ended, 106
and racial integration is rarely discussed as a major policy agenda in
traditional public schools.107 Thus, it is hypocritical to attack
charters and vouchers for a weakness that traditional public schools
also have.108
While voucher and charter advocates are correct that
integration no longer occupies the same priority as it once did, to
suggest that it is irrelevant to traditional public schools would be a
gross overstatement. The Supreme Court recently recognized that
schools have a compelling interest in voluntarily pursuing racial
integration and diversity.109 Social-science research continually
reaffirms the positive educational outcomes of integration for all
students.110 Relying in part on this research, one state supreme

105. Cf. Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a FailingPublic
Schools System, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 73, 103 (2001) (noting that the
goal of school vouchers is to force failing schools to adapt and improve).
106. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1157, 1159-60 (2000) (arguing that, although desegregation litigation was not
dead in 2000, most surviving cases suffered from severe neglect). But see

Dennis D. Parker, Are Reports of Brown's Demise Exaggerated?Perspectives of a
School Desegregation Litigator, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1069-70 (2005)
(concluding that desegregation litigation is not dead and maintains its
importance).
107. See Janet Ward Schofield & Leslie R.M. Hausmann, The Conundrum of

School Desegregation:Positive Student Outcomes and Waning Support, 66 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 83, 100 ("After decades of progress in desegregating America's
schools, we as a society are turning our backs on the policy of school
desegregation despite both the academic, economic, and social benefits of
attending desegregated schools . . . .").
108. See McConnell, supra note 59, at 129-30 (offering this criticism of
public schools and defending school choice on this front).
109. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
797-98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that school districts have a
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation and achieving a diverse student
population). Of course, preventing intentional segregation has been and always
will be a constitutional mandate.

110. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as EducationalResources and the
ConstitutionalRight to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 403-09 (2012); Robert
A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599,
620-21 (2011).
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court has mandated the integration of schools, even in the absence
of evidence of intentional segregation."1 ' In addition, over forty
school districts affirmatively use race or socioeconomic status to
achieve integration in their public schools.1 12 A far larger number of
districts, although refraining from taking affirmative steps to
increase integration, consciously maintain whatever level of
integration they currently have and lament the possibility of
resegregation.
Integration gains have always been hard fought and subject to
reversal. But so long as the courts or the local majority remained
committed to integration, integration was not subject to direct
subversion. 113 Parents could always move away or enroll their
children in private schools, and many did, 114 but those who
remained in the system would be compelled to participate in
integration. Most important, the state was prohibited from directly
facilitating the segregative acts of private actors.
Publicly financed support of individualized concepts of
education represents a retreat from these constitutional and
collective-based principles. Without clear limits and enforcement of
them, charter school and voucher programs facilitate parents' ability
to dissent not just in word but in action against integration.
Cumulative dissents of this nature threaten, and potentially render

111.

Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1271, 1290-91 (Conn. 1996) (noting

that most of the plaintiffs' actions were premised on de facto segregation and
holding that a declaratory judgment would be entered for the plaintiffs and
directing "the legislature and the executive branch to put the search for
appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas"); see also
Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1226-27 (N.Y. 2003) (dismissing the
complaint for failing to state a claim under the education article of the state
constitution despite allegations of state practices and policies resulting in high
concentrations of minority students in the school district); Class Action
22-25, NAACP v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-95-014800 (Minn.
Complaint at
Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1995) (arguing that the state allowed segregated schools to
continue to exist); Second Amended Complaint at IT 26-34, Hoke Cnty. v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 95 CVS 1158 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.law.unc.eduldocuments/civilrights
/briefs/2ndamendedcomplaint.pdf (arguing that the state adopted a plan that
would perpetuate racial and socioeconomic status segregation).
112. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUND., RESCUING BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS PURSUING
SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 41 (2007), available at http://tef.org/assets

/downloads/tcf-districtprofiles.pdf.

113. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460-67, 487
(1982) (striking down legislative efforts to prevent local districts from
desegregating).
114. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 314-15 (Gary Orfield & Susan E.
Eaton eds., 1996); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974)
(limiting a desegregation order that attempted to address white flight).
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infeasible, publicly enacted integration policy.
Consider Wake
County, North Carolina, which has run one of the most effective
voluntary desegregation plans in the country,11 5 and Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina, which until the late 1990s ran one of the
most effective mandatory desegregation plans in history and
followed it with some modest voluntary efforts. 116
Both districts now confront circumstances where charter schools
may undermine the integration the districts currently maintain or
seek to create. North Carolina historically limited the number of
charter schools in the state to one hundred (approximately one per
school district), 117 which afforded school districts significant control
over the demographics of their schools. With such control, the
voluntary integration plan in Wake County and the remnants of
mandatory and voluntary desegregation in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
bore a high likelihood of effectiveness. 118 In response to federal
incentives, however, North Carolina recently lifted its cap on charter
schools. 119 Removing the cap on charters drastically increases the
opportunity for integration dissenters to create their own schools or
fill seats in otherwise legitimately motivated charter schools. 120
Understanding the threat that publicly financed or sanctioned
dissent options present, courts barred analogous actions in
mandatory desegregation proceedings, even if such actions were not
clearly racially motivated. For instance, courts blocked neighboring
school districts from accepting student transfers when the effect was
to impede integration in the desegregating district.12 1 Federal and
115. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 112, at 4.
116. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir.
2001) (ending mandatory desegregation).
117. Meghan Knight, Comment, Cyber Charter Schools: An Analysis of

North Carolina's Current Charter School Legislation, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 395,
398 (2005).
118. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation

and Segregation:Evidence from the Charlotte-MecklenburgSchools, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1513, 1546 (2003) (finding that students from integrated elementary
schools in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg area performed better on standardized
tests in middle and high school).

119. Rob Christensen, Perdue Signs Law Lifting Cap on Charter
Schools,
NEWS
&
OBSERVER
(June
17,
2011,
6:08
P.M.),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/17/1281607/perdue-signs-law-lifting-cap
-on.html (discussing North Carolina's elimination of its cap on charter schools).
120. Cf. id. ("This bill will allow for more choices in our education
system ..... (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Leland Ware & Cara
Robinson, Charters, Choice, and Resegregation, 11 DEL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009)
(finding that charter schools are often more segregated than public schools).
121. See, e.g., Lee v. Eufaula City Bd. of Educ., 573 F.2d 229, 235 (5th Cir.
1978) (directing the district court to determine whether "the acceptance of any
transfers from Barbour County has the cumulative effect of reducing
desegregation or reinforcing the dual school system" and thus should be
enjoined).
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state charter policies, however, do very little, if anything, to guard
against these problems. Instead, by lifting caps on charters and
removing other restrictions, federal and state policy incentivize
charter schools and permit them to have the exact same negative
effects on duly enacted integration policies that desegregation
sought to prevent.122
With the caps on charters lifted, civil rights advocates in North
Carolina charge that charter schools are one of the biggest threats to
ongoing integration efforts in the state. 23 Over the past decade,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg has become the most segregated district in
the state, while also amassing the largest charter school population
in the state in terms of raw numbers and one of the largest in terms
of percentage.1 24 To be fair, the termination of court-ordered
desegregation is the primary cause of segregation in CharlotteMecklenburg, but charter schools exacerbate the problem and serve
as a significant block on attempts to remedy the problem.125 In fact,
charter applications show no abatement in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.
In 2012, sixteen percent of the state's charter school applications
were from Charlotte-Mecklenburg even though less than ten percent
of the state's students live there.126 Wake County has the secondhighest number of students in charter schools in terms of raw
numbers and is slightly above the state average in terms of
percentage.127 Its moderate percentage is likely a reflection of the
district's longstanding high academic quality,128 but the ongoing
122. Mark Dorosin & Benita N. Jones, Charters' Uneven Racial Makeup,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/04/27
/455015/charters-uneven-racial-makeup.html; see also Jamie Gullen, Colorblind

Education Reform: How Race-Neutral Policies PerpetuateSegregation and Why
Voluntary Integration Should Be Put Back on the Reform Agenda, 15 U. PA. J.L.
& Soc. CHANGE 251, 266-68 (2012).
123. Dorosin & Jones, supra note 122 (explaining the extent to which
charter schools in North Carolina have begun to evidence racial isolationism).
124. N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, CHARTER SCHOOL MEMBERSHIP BY
LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCY BY PERCENTAGE IN CHARTER SCHOOL MEMBERSHIP
at
2011-12
(2012),
available
SCHOOL
MONTH
1,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/membershippercentagell12.pdf.
125. Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankenberg, Does Law Influence

Charter School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal and State Legislation, 16
MICH. J. RACE & L. 321, 356-58 (2011) (examining the failure of North Carolina
legislative efforts to ensure diversity among charter schools).
126. See N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 124; 2013-2014
http://www.ncpublicschools.org
SCHOOLS,
Applications, OFF. CHARTER
/charterschools/applications/2013-14/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
127. N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 124.
128. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 252-54 (Brooking
Inst. Press ed., 2001) (discussing the educational effectiveness of Wake County
schools).
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debates over integration show signs of driving more charter school
interest and enrollment.129
Vouchers have not received as much attention on this front
because voucher programs are few in number and generally limited
in effect. More importantly, some older voucher programs have an
integrative purpose.130 Recent evidence, however, suggests a
resurgence of voucher interest with different motivations.' 3
Without value-based controls to check these motivations, vouchers,
like charters, can undermine racial equity and increase segregation.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,3 2
approving Cleveland's voucher program, offers an instructive
example.133 Because the legal issues before the Court in Zelman
related primarily to religion,134 no serious attention was given to
integration. But in justifying the program, the Court emphasized
that the motivation for the voucher program was to provide better
education options for poor and predominantly minority students in
Cleveland's school district. 3 5 Therein lies the tragic irony that was
lost on the Court: the program did nothing to address the source of
the problem.
First, as in many other struggling inner-city school districts,
vouchers for Cleveland's students cannot be fairly characterized as
gratuitous offers from the state or as accommodations for parents
with leanings toward individual-based education. 3 6
Rather,
vouchers were the state's sad substitute for remedying what was
likely a constitutionally inadequate education. 3 7 The Supreme
Court of Ohio had already recognized five years prior to Zelman in
DeRolph v. State' 38 that students have a right to an adequate
education under the state constitution and that the state's education
system was failing to deliver it.139 While vouchers may have freed
129. See Dorosin & Jones, supra note 122.
130. Robert Holland & Don Soifer, How School Choice Benefits the Urban
Poor, 45 How. L.J. 337, 362-65 (2002) (asserting that research indicates that
allowing parents to choose children's schools has increased racial integration).
131. See Cavanagh, supra note 7.

132. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
133. Klint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and Privatization of
American Education: Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1149 (2004).
134. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49.
135. Id. at 644.
136. See id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the voucher
program only provided relief for fewer than five percent of the students in the
Cleveland City School District).
137. Id. at 684-85.
138. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
139. Id. at 747 ("We therefore hold that Ohio's elementary and secondary
public school financing system violates ... the Ohio Constitution, which
mandates a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
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some students from unconstitutional conditions, they did nothing for
the students left behind. Recognizing this in advance, many
minority parents choose vouchers not because they want to but
because they are justifiably skeptical of the state's willingness to fix
the underlying problem; they feel they have no choice other than to
accept the state's half-measures. 140
Second, vouchers did nothing to alleviate Cleveland's
segregation problem. Instead, vouchers reinforced segregation by
disproportionately helping advantaged students leave an
overwhelmingly disadvantaged school district: while only twentythree percent of students in Cleveland's schools were middle income,
forty percent of the students who received vouchers were middle
income. 141 In other words, middle-income students were more than
twice as likely to receive a voucher as low-income students. 142 Thus,
vouchers increased rather than decreased poverty concentration in
Cleveland's public schools.
National studies suggest that the experiences of Wake County,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Cleveland are prime examples of a
disturbing trend rather than exceptions. At the school-district level,
state."); see also DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002) ("[T]he
General Assembly has not focused on the core constitutional directive of . . 'a
complete systematic overhaul' of the school-funding system."); DeRolph v. State,
678 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Ohio 1997) ("The creating of a constitutional system for
financing elementary and secondary public education in Ohio is not only a
proper function of the General Assembly, it is also expressly mandated by the
Ohio Constitution.").
140. See generally James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers:
A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 567-73 (2007)
(discussing the repacking of the voucher agenda to appeal to African
Americans).
141. Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (indicating that sixty percent of the
students using vouchers were low income), with Common Core of Data (CCD),
NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2013) (choose "Build a Table" hyperlink; select "District" as the row variable;
choose "2001-2002" as the school year; select "Basic Information (X): Agency
Name - By Survey Year (District)," "Total Enrollment: Total Students (School)"
and "Students in Special Programs: Total Free and Reduced Lunch Students
(School)" as the columns; choose "Ohio" as the filter; click the "View Table"
hyperlink; click the "7"hyperlink to reach page seven of the table) (showing
that in the 2001 to 2002 academic year, 55,333 students out of 72,080 total
students were on free or reduced lunch). The number of children on free or
reduced lunch is the most commonly used indicator of student poverty and is
currently the only way to measure the percentage of low-income students in
school. See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 125, at 362-63.
142. (40/23) / (60/77) = 2.2 (This multiplier was calculated by taking the
percentage of students that were not listed as low income in Zelman and
dividing it by the percentage of students not receiving free or reduced lunch in
Cleveland schools. The result was then divided by the result of the percentage
of students listed as low income in Zelman divided by the percentage of
students that were receiving free or reduced lunch in Cleveland schools.).
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data indicate that the more African American students that are
enrolled in a school district, the more students enroll in charter
schools. 143 This basic point, however, can be misleading, as a
substantial number of charter schools open in minority
neighborhoods and disproportionately enroll minorities.144 These
students are seemingly fleeing from failing schools rather than
integration. Thus, large-scale studies that do not account for this
sort of local variation overstate the notion that charter schools are
universally driving or catering to segregative impulses.
More nuanced studies, however, still find a troubling connection
between race, illicit motivations, and charter schools. For instance,
a detailed study of Michigan charter schools took multiple local
variables into account and found that districts with greater racial
heterogeneity, more private schools, and higher spending on special
education tend to have more charter schools. 145 In other words,
integrated districts, or those with the capacity to integrate, along
with those districts attempting to meet their obligations to special
needs students, are the very places where charters are more likely
to spring up.146 A 2002 study of Texas charter schools similarly
found that a student's race is a partial predictor of whether and
where a student enrolls in a charter school, with students skewing
toward schools that reflect the students' own race.14 7 In this respect,
charter schools strongly resemble private schools, which studies
have shown tend to be a response to racial heterogeneity and a
precipitant of decreased financial support for public schools.1 48 In
short, these studies suggest that a large percentage of charters are a
response to collective values of racial and special needs inclusion,
and consistent with low commitments to public education in general.
B.

Competition: Finances,Students, and Facilities
While the potential racial impacts of charters on public schools
are serious, the fiercest battles have arisen over competition for
scarce resources. At the macro level, the overall pot of funds
devoted to elementary and secondary schools has not significantly
143. Christiana Stoddard & Sean P. Corcoran, The Political Economy of
School Choice: Support for Charter Schools Across States and School Districts,
62 J. URB. EcoN. 27, 47 (2007).
144. Id. at 40-41.

145. Linda Renzulli, Organizational Environments and the Emergence of
CharterSchools in the United States, 78 Soc. EDUC. 1, 16, 19 (2005).
146. Cf. id.
147. Gregory R. Weiher & Kent L. Tedin, Does Choice Lead to Racially
Distinctive Schools? Charter Schools and Household Preferences, 21 J. POL'Y
ANALYsis & MGMT. 79, 88, 91 (2002).

148. Sean Corcoran & William N. Evans, Income Inequality, the Median
Voter, and the Support for Public Education 33 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16097, 2010).
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increased in recent years and, in some places, has actually shrunk
as a result of the 2008 recession. 149 In contrast, the public funds
available for charters, at both the federal and state level, have
drastically increased in recent years. 150 No complicated formulas
are required to see that funds are shifting from traditional public
schools to charters. If one believes that public schools tend to be
flush with resources or waste whatever resources they have, this
shift is not necessarily problematic. But research and litigation
suggest that neither is true. Rather, a significant portion of
traditional public schools has been underfunded for some time.15 1
Charter proponents argue the foregoing misframes funding
trends. They argue that charters themselves are not reducing the
funding available for public schools. Rather, funding has just
shifted from one public school sector to another.15 2 Moreover,
because education funding does not belong to traditional public
schools, education funds should follow students to the public schools
that serve them best.153 Charters may have a point as a general
matter, but this response obscures the fact that many charters
operate on an individual-based concept of education rather than a
collective-based one.154 Thus, even if it were fair to say money is
only moving from one public school to another, public money is being
diverted away from collective-based education to individual-based
education. To the extent the public sees charters as something other

149. Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CENTER ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIEs (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa-view
&id=1214.
150. Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity:
School Choice and Racial Integration in the Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 219, 244 (2010) (discussing specific federal budget increases for charter
schools and their comparison to other programs). In 2009, the Obama
Administration used a $4.3 billion competitive grant program ("Race to the
Top") to leverage changes in state policies. Sam Dillon, Administration Takes
Aim at State Laws on Teachers, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 2009, at Al5 (noting that
one of the most notable demands was eliminating caps on charters); Sam Dillon,
After Criticism, the Administration Is Praised for Final Rules on Education
Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A20 (stating that substantial increases in
state funding will necessarily follow).
151. See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 24, at 5, 7, 14-19; Michael A. Rebell,
Poverty, "Meaningful"Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the
Courts, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1467, 1500 (2007) (explaining that school finance
litigation reveals inequity and inadequacy).
TACKLING
CHILD:
THE
FUND
152. THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST.,
INEQUITY

& ANTIQUITY

IN

SCHOOL

FINANCE

14

(2006),

http://www.edexcellence.net/publications/fundthechild.html.
153. Id. at 13-14.
154. Id. at 21.

available at
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than pure public schools, this diversion may also erode support for
public schools in general. 155
The battle between charter schools and traditional public
schools over resources at the local level is even more obvious,
particularly in regard to facilities and student enrollments, the
latter of which correspond with money.15 6 Unsurprisingly, New
York City rests at the epicenter of facility tensions. There, both
traditional public schools and charter schools argue that they lack
adequate facilities, and both are seemingly correct.15 7 But rather
than lifting the tide for both camps, reports suggest that the school
district is facilitating a "crabs in a barrel" syndrome by transferring
significant space to charter schools from public schools. 58 In fact,
tensions were so high recently that the NAACP brought suit against
the school district on behalf of students in traditional public
schools.159 The NAACP argued that the district was forcing
traditional public school students to eat lunch two hours early,
limiting their use of the library, and was moving them to
undesirable locations within the building, all so that charter school
students could have additional and preferable access to those same
facilities. 60 Although not as dramatic, analogous facility struggles
are occurring across the country, so much so that Congress has even
sought to address the issue.161 Competition for students is equally

155. Gutmann, supra note 37, at 178-79; see also MINOW, supra note 76, at

22 (discussing "disillusionment with government solutions and faith in private
approaches").
156. See generally Lisa Lukasik, Deconstructinga Decade of Charter School
Funding Litigation:An Argument for Reform, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1885, 1897-918

(2012) (discussing the battles in North Carolina); Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A
Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School Funding and Strategies for
Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 How. L.J. 1057, 1067-95
(2012) (arguing that charter schools and public schools should be funded equally
by the state).
157. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 2006) (discussing the history of school finance litigation in New York City
and its relationship to facilities); N.Y.C. CHARTER SCH. CTR., UNEQUAL SHARES:
THE SURPRISING FACTS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS AND OVERCROWDING 1 (2011),

available at
http://www.nyccharterschools.org/sites/default/files/resources
/unequal-shares.pdf.
158. See, e.g., Juan Gonzalez, Eva Moskowitz Has Special Access to Schools
Chancellor Klein-And Support Others Can Only Dream of, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 25, 2010, at 10; Juan Gonzalez, Students at PS 123 in Harlem Are Pushed
Aside for CharterSchool Expansion, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2009, at 10. But
see N.Y.C. CHARTER SCH. CTR., supra note 157, at 7-8.
159. Benjamin Todd Jealous, Op-Ed, Why the NAACP Is Suing New York,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2011, at Al5.
160. Id.

161. Empowering Parents Through Quality Charter Schools Act, H.R. 2218,
112th Cong. (2011) (stating one of its purposes as extending equitable resources
for charter school facilities); see also Alyson Klein, House Gives Bipartisan
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fierce because of the serious financial consequences that follow. In
some states, when a student transfers to a charter school, the local
school district must fund his or her education out of the school
district's budget, which can include local and state funds. 162 In
other states, local districts only lose the per-pupil allotment from the
state. 163 Either way, whoever wins the competition for students
ultimately wins the battle over money. 164 From the charter school
theorists' perspective, this is the whole point and will drive school
improvement in both sectors. 165 But, as discussed earlier, serious
questions remain as to whether public schools can effectively
function as a market. And, regardless of the effectiveness of the
market, charters are better positioned to exploit it than traditional
schools. 166
First, while charters may compete amongst themselves-which
will work to the determinant of some--charter schools on the whole
have little to lose from competition and public schools nothing to
gain. This is not to say charters do not face numerous start-up
challenges and costs they stand to forfeit; they do. 167 But the
movement of students is, by default, movement to charter schools
and hence to their benefit. 168 Moreover, in general, the movement of
a student to a charter school is not an economically neutral transfer

Stamp of Approval to Charter Bill,

EDUC. WK. (Sept. 13, 2011, 2:57 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2011/09/but-behind-thescenes
some.html.
162. Curtis, supra note 156, at 1079.
163. Id. at 1080.
164. See Note, supra note 81, at 2006 (noting that money "follows the

student"); Closing the Achievement Gap, Charter School FAQ, PBS (Jan. 17,
2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/closingtheachievementgap/faq.html#q8.

165. Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and
the New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1301 (1998); Curtis,
supra note 156, at 1085.
166. Huffman, supranote 165, at 1308.

167. See, e.g., R. David Walk, Jr., How EducationalManagement Companies
Serve Charter Schools and Their Students, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 241, 251-52 (2003)
(discussing the advantages of management companies and their impact on the
In
problem of start-up funds); Curtis, supra note 156, at 1061.
fact, challenges regarding funding, student turnover, scaling-up, and
management are so great that studies routinely evaluate charter schools.
NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.

CHARTER SCH., CHARTER

SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT:

WHAT WE KNow 2 (2009) available at http://www.publiccharters.org
/data/files/Publication_docs/Summary-ofAchievementStudiesFifthEdition
2009_Final_20110402T222331.pdf (noting that there are currently over two
hundred studies examining charter school achievement).
168. See generally NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A
GROWING

MOVEMENT:

AMERICA'S

LARGEST CHARTER

SCHOOL COMMUNITIES

2 (2012), available at http://publiccharters.org/data/files/Publicationdocs
/NAPCS%202012%20Market%20Share%20Report20121113T125312.pdf.
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of money. 169 Consider, for instance, that traditional public schools
have a relatively static set of fixed costs, largely because, by design,
they serve communities in their entirety. In a county school district
that has one middle school that serves 750 students, a loss of fifty
students, spread across three grade levels, to a charter school is
unlikely to change the public schools' operating costs. The loss is
just small enough that the district cannot downsize its teaching staff
without also downsizing its curriculum.
If the curriculum is
mandated by the state, the middle school may have no choice but to
continue operating with the same staff as before. And, in any event,
the school will still have the same costs in terms of facilities, buses,
and principals. If the per-pupil funding that went to the charter
schools was $7000, the traditional public school must provide the
same services as before but with $350,000 less. Thus, when enough
costs are fixed and monetary losses are too great, charter school
growth can threaten the financial viability of a public school. 170 The
threat can also create the aforementioned vicious cycle whereby
rational actors are incentivized to preemptively exit, which only
further exacerbates decline and rationalizes exit. 171
Second, charters can exercise an unfair advantage over
traditional public schools by competing for only a subset of students.
In particular, charter schools can target those students whom
charters perceive to be the most attractive, whereas public schools
do not actively target students but rather enroll, and are required to
enroll, all eligible students.172
These dissimilar principles of
enrollment can unfairly undermine the attractiveness of public
schools.
A good deal of research has gone into the extent to which
charters "cream" the most motivated students from the overall pool

169. Although discussing interdistrict transfer programs, one author notes
this problem when students leave a struggling school district for another. Note,
supra note 81, at 2004-06 (discussing the danger of school failure that transfers
can pose).
170. Id. at 2004-05 & n.8.
171. In the context of vouchers, Justice Souter emphasized that the voucher
system in Cleveland incentivized students to attend religious schools that did
not even correlate with their own religious views. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 703-04 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See generally Kevin Booker et al., The Effect of Charter Schools on
School Peer Composition 1-2 (RAND Corp., Working Paper WR-306-EDU,
2005), available at http://www.ncspe.org/publicationsfiles/RAND_WR306.pdf
(discussing the fears the possibility of creaming creates). The most egregious
example of charter creaming is the growing trend of charter schools designed
specifically for gifted and talented students. Janet R. Decker et al., Charter

Schools Designed for Gifted and Talented Students: Legal and Policy Issues and
Considerations,259 EDUC. LAW REP. 1, 1-2 (2010).
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of local students or exclude high-need students. 173 Studies that
reliably measure whether charters cream motivated students are in
relatively short supply due to problems with fairly indentifying and
comparing student motivation. 174 But on the question of "cropping"
or discouraging the enrollment of high need students, the data tend
to show that charters do, in fact, enroll significantly smaller
percentages of high-need students-particularly disabled and
English Language Learner ("ELL") students-than traditional
public schools. 175 Thus, charter schools indirectly increase the
percentage of high-need students and the cost of educating them in
traditional public schools, both of which place traditional public
schools at a competitive disadvantage in retaining other students.17 6
In effect, in a system whereby charter schools play by different
rules, public schools are punished for being open to all.
Finally, profit motives can incentivize actions that are contrary
to the good of students (whether from a collective or individual
standpoint). 177 Cognizant of this risk, federal and most state laws
place limits on who can receive a charter to operate a charter
school. 178
In particular, they prohibit for-profit entities from
starting charters. 179 This prohibition, however, is more symbolic
than substantive, as it does not stop the charter school from

173. For an overview of the debate and some of the literature, see generally
RON ZIMMER ET AL., Do CHARTER SCHOOLS "CREAM SEIM" STUDENTS AND INCREASE
RACIAL-ETHNIC SEGREGATION? (2009), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu

Ischoolchoice/conference/papers/ZimmerCOMPLETE.pdf.
174. More recently, studies have attempted to isolate this problem by
looking at charter schools with lottery enrollments and comparing those who
won the lottery to those who did not, as they were similarly situated groups
prior to the lottery. Do Charters 'Cream' the Best?: A New Study Finds
Breakthrough Evidence, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2009), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052970204488304574429203296812582.html.
ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT
CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
STANDARDS 12-13 (2010) (indicating the underenrollment of disabled and ELL
175.

EQUITY:

students); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter
Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 681-84 (2012). One study indicates that charters
are not necessarily creaming off the highest ability students from public
schools, but they are "cropping" off students who require the most services.
Natalie Lacireno-Paquet et al., Creaming Versus Cropping: Charter School
Enrollment Practicesin Response to Market Incentives, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL'Y ANALYSIS 145, 150 (2002).
176. Lacireno-Paquet, supra note 175, at 155.
177. See generally MINOW, supra note 76, at 41-42, 62 (discussing the

conflicts of interest that arise when for-profit entities engage in public or
nonprofit activities).
178. Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School
Statutes that Blur the Public/PrivateDistinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349,
362 (2003).
179. Id.
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subcontracting for various educational services, if not all of them,
with whomever it wishes. Thus, a routine practice is for a nonprofit
to obtain a charter and then transfer all operational responsibility
Under these
and financing to a private for-profit entity. 18 0
circumstances, the charter school is nonprofit in name only. 181
Through these and other types of arrangements, several egregious
cases of profit maximization in charter schools, which operate to the
detriment of students, have come to light in recent years.182 While
these cases are likely exceptions to the rule in terms of their
severity, and traditional schools are not free from corruption
themselves, it is hard to discount the likelihood that, at the margins,
profit motives exert corrupting incentives beyond those that would
otherwise exist in traditional public schools.183
Yet, notwithstanding the various foregoing practical critiques,
charter schools and vouchers are neither inherently good nor bad.
Rather, the absence of clear standards aligned with the public good,
along with implementation oversight, permits charter schools and
vouchers to serve the ends that are inconsistent with the public
good. Thus, the next Part cautions against polemic discussions and
instead focuses on how to bring alternatives to traditional public
schools more squarely within the ambit of the public good.
III. FRAMING A NEW CONVERSATION ABOUT CHARTERS, VOUCHERS,
PRIVATIZATION, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD

The foregoing discussion of charter and voucher programs does
not paint a very favorable picture. The point is not to condemn
charters and vouchers per se but to point out the weaknesses in
current charter and voucher policies. The weaknesses stem not
from charters or vouchers themselves but from overly

180. Id. In 2005, for-profit management companies ran over four hundred
charter schools. Fiona Greaves & Preston Green, The Legal Issues Surrounding

PartnershipsBetween Charter Schools and For-ProfitManagement Companies,
206 EDUc. L. REP. 27, 27-29 (2006). The number of charter schools, in general,
has grown drastically since then. The number of charter schools run by forprofit companies may have as well.
181. See Mead, supra note 178, at 362-65 (discussing litigation challenging
the grant of charters on this basis, but indicating courts' rejection of the claim).

182. See, e.g., Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools
and Financial Accountability, 44 URB. LAw. 37, 39, 49-51, 72, 73
(2012); Sean Cavanagh, PhiladelphiaFounder Charged with Fraud,EDUC. WK.

(July 29,

2012,

3:19

PM),

http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice

/2012/07/philadelphiacharter founder-Chargedwithfraud.html; Lauren Roth,

NorthStar Charter's $519,000 Payout to Principal of Failed Florida School,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/10/26/charter-school-spent-more n_2021140.html?ref=topbar.
183. See DeJarnatt, supra note 182, at 39 (arguing for greater oversight of
charters for this reason).
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imbuing current policies with individual-based concepts and
underemphasizing the collective good. Charter schools, and to some
extent vouchers, are pedagogically empty vessels. The beauty in
them is that they can be formed them to meet any number of
agendas. The problem is that they have been hijacked by or, less
malevolently, appropriated for the ends of questionable agendas.
The task now for those committed to school improvement and
equal opportunity is to clearly articulate the public good in
education and redirect charter, voucher, and privatization policy
toward it. From the perspective of the group, the question cannot
simply be whether voucher and charter programs improve
educational outcomes for the students enrolled in them but whether
and how the programs serve the public good. 184 Improving student
achievement is certainly an important factor in assessing whether a
program serves the public good, but it is not the only, or necessarily
the primary, question. 185 By relying on student achievement as the
only, or dominant, factor in charter and voucher policies, public
policy implicitly cedes to an individual concept of the public good in
education.
Commitment to education as a public good and for the benefit of
the group would require that we go behind student achievement and
ask questions about the value-based ends charters and vouchers
might serve: the extent to which charters fundamentally operate
like public schools, the extent to which charters and vouchers are
constrained by public values, and the extent to which charters and
vouchers represent dissent from public values. Because these
questions are matters of degree rather than absolutes, future policy
changes could push charters and vouchers along a spectrum,
regardless of where they stand now. Thus, the goal need not be to
end or condemn charters and vouchers but to soberly examine
whether they further the collective good and how they can evolve.
A.

What Makes a School Public?
In its critiques and defenses, this Essay has strongly implied a
definition of the public good in education, but up until this point it
has resisted offering a conclusive definition. The Essay has instead
focused on the theoretical and practical tensions between the
competing concepts of the public good and allowed that both could
184.

See STACY SMITH, THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF CHARTER SCHOOLS

(2001) (focusing on how charters might serve democracy); Rosenblum, supra
note 69, at 151 (arguing that it would be a betrayal of public institutions to say
that it does not matter whether children attend public or private schools so long
as they have access to education).
185. With all its focus on standardized test scores, even No Child Left
Behind evaluated school characteristics beyond achievement. See, e.g., 20
U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2) (2006) (measuring teacher quality).
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lay claim on the public good under the certain circumstances. But
when one goes one step further and seriously considers what makes
a school public in our current democratic constitutional system, the
answer to the meaning of the public good in education emerges: it is
the collective good.
1. Being Labeled Public?
Given that a full discussion of what makes a school "public"
could consume an entire essay, this Essay only outlines the key
aspects of a public school. As an initial matter, the act of statutorily
affixing the label "public" to a school does not automatically make a
school "public" in any real, substantive sense.18 6 Consider that our
military constructs its planes, warships, and facilities through
private contractors in private spaces. Tomorrow, Congress could
pass legislation defining these private contractors and spaces as
public, but would doing so transform their work sites and employees
into public places and employees? Not without violating a host of
constitutional prohibitions.'8 7 Would merely attaching the label
"public" to these contractors create any substantive change, or
would it merely change the public's perception of them? Being
public requires substantive characteristics, not just a label. Thus,
labeling charter schools-or any other school for that matter-public
does not resolve the question of whether they are really public.
2. FreeAccess
One of the most tangible aspects of being public is public
financial support and the provision of services free, or nearly free, of
charge.188 In these respects, charter schools are as public as any
other school. 189 Being free of charge, however, does not alone render
a service or entity substantively public. For instance, some cities
have government employees who collect the trash, while others have
contractors. 190 While both accomplish the same task free of charge
to citizens, the former is most likely "public" trash collection,

186. Because these legislative labels do not actually answer the question,
scholars and commentators have varied in how they characterize charters.
Mead, supra note 178, at 352 (noting that charter schools have been called
"quasi-public," "other nonpublic," and "hybrid public schools").
187. Without just compensation, such an act would present problems under
the Takings Clause. It would likely present Fifth Amendment problems in any
event.
188. HUGH STRETTON & LIONEL ORCHARD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE, PUBLIC CHOICE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY
ATTACK ON GOVERNMENT 54 (1994).

189. But see Mead, supra note 178, at 367-68 (indicating that some states
have left open the possibility that charter schools could charge tuition).
190. See id. at 351, 362-64.
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whereas the latter is "publicly funded" trash collection.' 9 ' This
distinction bears little practical relevance in the context of trash
collection because, once the city decides to have trash collection,
very few, if any, value or mission judgments arise. Thus, anyone
can carry out the task, but this would not be true if trash collectors
had discretion as to what items they would collect in the trash.192
One would likely see an immediate difference between public and
publicly financed trash collection if this were the case.

3.

Equal Access

Education, unlike trash collection, involves myriad value and
mission-based judgments, and, thus, the distinction between public
education and publicly funded education is crucial. 193 The mission
of a public school is to serve its community and all of the students
within it without making distinctions of any sort between them.194
Federal statutes specifically prohibit discrimination on various
grounds and require public schools to go out of their way, if
necessary, to serve certain disadvantaged groups of students. 195 The
Supreme Court went one step further in Plyler v. Doe and held that
public schools are obligated to serve even those students who are
illegally in the country because those students, nonetheless, reside
within our jurisdictions and are part of our communities.196 In
short, public elementary and secondary schools do not pick or
differentiate among their students. 97 In contrast, nonpublic schools
do. In fact, differentiating among students based on merit, wealth,
ability, and other factors is a major premise of many nonpublic

191.

See id. at 351-52.

192. See MINOW, supra note 76, at 32-33 (discussing the distinction between
what is public and private and noting the problems that arise when the
government is both the purchaser and guarantor of public values).
193. See Minow, supra note 14, at 1229-32.
194.

See,

e.g.,

Mission

Statement,

PUB.

SCHOOLS

N.C.,

http://www.ncpublicschools.org/organization/mission/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2013).
195. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1450 (2006) (requiring special education services for students
with disabilities); id. §§ 1681-1683 (prohibiting gender discrimination); Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, id. § 1703 (requiring equal educational
opportunity and affirmative action to assist ELL); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(prohibiting recipients of federal financial aid from discriminating on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin; id. §§ 11431-11435 (requiring
assistance for homeless students and prohibiting discrimination).
196. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-30 (1982).

197. Of course, there is no absolute bar to public schools selecting students,
but it runs counter to their nature. See generally Fennell, supra note 19, at 76-

78.
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schools. 198 And, to the extent that they do not receive federal funds,
private schools remain free to discriminate on any number of bases
that would be prohibited in public schools. 199 Even to the extent
federal statutes might constrain private schools' ability to
discriminate against students based on race, gender, or disability,
private schools still remain free to pick those students they deem
worthier than others based on merit and other factors. 200
4. Constitutionaland DemocraticAccountability
Public schools' mission also extends to fostering the earlier
discussed values once students are enrolled, including democracy,
equality, and tolerance. Public schools pursue these ends not only
because they are public values but also because the Constitution
mandates as much. 201 This is no small distinction. As state actors,
public schools are bound to treat students (and teachers) fairly,
which entails, among other things, equality, rationality, and
viewpoint neutrality.202 Moreover, these obligations extend not only
to individual students but to groups of students, schools, and
districts.203 Equality offers a touchstone example. From its decision

198. See, e.g., Mission & Vision, OUR LADY MERCY SCH. FOR YOUNG WOMEN,
http://www.mercyhs.com/about-mercy/mission-and-vision (last visited Mar. 26,
2013) (applying an all-girls admission policy).
199. The constitutional prohibitions against discrimination do not apply to
private actors.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
Further, the
provisions noted in note 195 do not apply unless a private school is receiving
federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. There is one statutory exception to this
general rule. See id. § 1981 (prohibiting racial discrimination in private
contracts); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that §
1981's prohibition extends to admissions decisions of private schools).
200. See, e.g., Academy Mission Statement, PHILLIPS EXETER ACAD.,
http://www.exeter.edulaboutus/171-9259.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2013)
(noting the school's express desire for students "who combine proven academic
ability, intellectual curiosity, and tenacity with decency and good character").
201. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996)
(holding that women receive intermediate scrutiny under Equal Protection
Clause analysis); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (holding that the children of illegal
aliens receive intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969) (holding
that the speech of teachers and students at public schools is protected unless
the school believes it will lead to a "substantial disruption"); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that "separate but equal" public school
segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding
that the constitutional protections found in Brown v. Board of Education
extended to students with special needs and behavioral problems).
202. See statutes and accompanying text cited supranote 195.
203. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55
(1973) (holding that unequal state expenditures between school districts must
rationally further a legitimate state purpose to be constitutional). State courts

480

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

of whether to assign a student to special education classes to its
decision of how to fund schools and districts, the state and all its
subsidiary public schools must ensure equal treatment of and
opportunity for all students. 204
Any number of private schools might hold these same values, as
they are not inherently unique to public schools. But private schools
are free to bend, ignore, and modify these values. 205 Likewise,
statutes might impose equality obligations on nonpublic schools that
receive federal funds or fall within some other statutory
classification,206 but private schools are free to decline federal money
or alter their status to avoid falling within the ambit of other
statutes.207 For that matter, legislators can exempt private schools
from statutory prohibitions at any time and, in fact, have done so on
occasion. 208 In short, those values that make schools public create
inviolable rights in public schools, in contrast to nonpublic schools,
where those values are gratuitous, to the extent they even exist.
Constitutions and statutes, however, are but one piece of the
public schools' accountability structure. Perhaps more important
than legal accountability is their political accountability. From the
governor and department of education officials to the school board,
superintendent, and principals, public education is democratically
accountable. 209 To state it another way, people collectively set the
rules for public schools.
Nonpublic
schools,
in
contrast,
lack
democratic
accountability. 210 Many argue that consumer accountability is more
have been far more exacting in this regard. See generally Rebell, supra note
151, at 1500-04.
204. See supra notes 195, 199, 201-03 and accompanying text.
205. Minow, supra note 14, at 1230 (questioning the private sector's
willingness to abide by constitutional norms).
206. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for instance, would apply to
schools falling within the definition of a public accommodation or employer,
even if the school did not receive federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A),
12181(7)(J) (2006).
207. For instance, Bob Jones University famously forewent federal funding
so that it could continue discriminating based on race. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1982) (holding that the IRS revoking the
university's tax exempt status was constitutional due to the university's ban on
interracial dating).
208. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (creating various institutional exemptions
from the general prohibition on sex discrimination).

209. See generally Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and
Democracy: Does Public ParticipationMatter?, 53 VILL. L. REV. 297 (2008)
(explaining that the ability for electoral participation at all levels allows for
democratic accountability in education). But see id. at 348 (finding that
mayoral takeover of schools undermines the democratic functioning and
accountability of schools).
210. PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, THE FACTS ABOUT VOUCHERS 1 (2002),
availableat http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/files/file_137.pdf.
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effective than democratic accountability, 2 11 and often they are
correct. For instance, consumers of education, as a practical matter,
are more likely to affect immediate change in nonpublic schools. 2 12
But there are important limits and caveats to consumer influence.
First, the larger community has little influence on nonpublic
schools, whereas everyone has the capacity to influence public
schools. 2 13 Second, even those consumers who can exert influence on
private schools may find that it is only as to microlevel issues or
those issues that the school is willing to negotiate. The educational
direction of nonpublic schools ultimately rests solely in the hands of
the private school's leadership and is not subject to formal checks. 2 14
Unlike in public schools, consumers cannot unelect the boss or
bosses in private schools. Their only option is to go elsewhere.
5. Consensus Rule
Finally, schools are public because they represent the
democratic will of the people. Schools that represent something
other than the will of the people are not public in a substantive
sense. While these points might seem obvious, they bear noting
because, as suggested previously, they mark the outer limits of the
role that dissent can play in public schools. Because public schools
operate based on democratic consensus, both the dissenter and
consenter must abide by the consensus rules. 215 While nonpublic
schools can tolerate relatively high levels of individual action and
dissent-as individuals can sort themselves into varying nonpublic
schools-a system of public schools risks falling apart because it is
predicated on collective action. 2 16 Thus, a hallmark of public
schools, for better or worse, is to compel conformity and limit
dissenters' capacity to overrule the majority.
ASCHER ETAL., supra note 78.
212. See id. at 16-17 (noting that parents in the nonpublic school realm can
create change by leaving a school they are unhappy with instead of having to
attend "unproductive PTA and school board meetings").
213. The Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925),
recognized that the state has the authority to reasonably regulate private
schools; however, that authority has proven relatively limited. The state could
entice private schools to consent to more regulation by offering them more funds
or vouchers, but the idea of outside accountability is sufficiently antithetical to
their mission that many may be willing to forego the carrot. At the very least,
they are vigorously resisting accountability measures in current voucher
programs. See PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, supra note 210, at 1, 3-4.
211.

214. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of
Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753,
764-66 (2000) (discussing the freedom charter school founders and
administrators have from local educational bureaucracies in developing
educational policies).
215. GUTMANN, supra note 40, at 39.
216. MINOW, supra note 76.
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B.

Are CharterSchools Substantively Public Schools?
With these broad outlines, the question is whether charter
schools are substantively public schools and, if not, what steps are
necessary to make them public. Of course, state statutes label them
as such, but if labels do not confer substantive status, something
more must be said of charters. Implicitly recognizing the distinction
between labels and substance, commentators and scholars have
struggled with how to characterize charter schools. Although some
assert charters are public with no explanation beyond the fact that
statutes label them as such, 217 more often scholars characterize
them as "quasi-public" 218 or hybrid-public schools. 219 These latter
characterizations implicitly acknowledge that important aspects of
charter schools distinguish them from public schools. Yet, the fact
that they are publicly funded and offer free education cautions
against eschewing the public characterization altogether.
At some point, however, variations between charter schools and
the essential meaning of public schools are too significant, and a
school is either public or not. If the label quasi-public is accurate, a
strong case can be made that charters are not public schools. To call
a school quasi-public may be to say it looks and acts like a public
school in various respects, but it is not really a public school. For
instance, courts label some agreements or understandings between
people as "quasi-contracts" and, in doing so, impose contractual
responsibilities on the parties, but a "quasi-contract" is a quasicontract and not an actual contract because it lacks some crucial
element of a contract. 220
In practice, charter schools, like quasi-contracts, lack crucial
elements of the label to which they aspire. In particular, charters
diverge from the public school concept in terms of their student
enrollment, oversight, and potentially insular missions. 221 This
divergence, in all fairness, is not likely true of all charters, as
217. See generally Mead, supra note 178 (noting that state legislatures have
expanded the definition of public school to include charter school, but
acknowledging the differences between charter schools and traditional public
schools).
218. James G. Dwyer, The Parental Choice Fallacy in Education Reform
Debates, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1837, 1843 (2012).
219. Mead, supra note 178, at 352.
220. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1:6 (4th ed. 2007).
221. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 214, at 765-66, 768-69 (discussing the
lack of regulation imposed on charter schools and the lack of oversight for
admissions procedures in charter schools); Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without

Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of
Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 307 n.27, 308 (1997) (noting that
charter school missions differ from public school missions and the lack of
oversight of charter schools).
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charters operate in diverse ways, 222 but few states sufficiently
regulate charters in the manner necessary to ensure that they, as a
group, adhere to key public school characteristics. 223 In effect, those
charters that act consistent with public values are effectively doing
so on a voluntary basis, just as a private school could.
Whether charter schools actually set out to attract particular
types of students or incidentally happen to is of little import. Unlike
traditional public schools, they neither serve the community as a
whole nor a representative sample of the community. 224 These
enrollment variations can be overcome if policy makers will devote
attention to the students who attend charters rather than just how
many attend them. If policy makers want charters to reflect the
demographics of the communities in which they reside, they need
only mandate and enforce as much. After enrollments became
extremely skewed in some high-profile charters, New York reacted
to the problem by enacting rules that place limits on demographic
variances. 225 If the state finds the political will to enforce the rule,
the rule has the capacity to prevent illegitimate flight and creaming,
and ensure that its charter schools are more accessible to the
broader community. 226
Charter enrollment rules, however, ought not be so strict that
they limit the possibility of creating integrated schools. In a district
that is overwhelmingly comprised of minorities and the poor, racial
and poverty isolation are major causes of educational inadequacy
and inequality. 227 Starting charters that replicate this isolation will
not offer realistic solutions to the underlying problems these
students face. 228 A rule flatly mandating that charter enrollments

222.

SUSAN

RETHINKING

DYNARSKI ET AL., CHARTER ScHooLs: A REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION 2 (2010), available at

http://www.brookings.edul-/medialresearch/files/reports/2010/12/16%20charter
%20schools/1216 _charter_schools.
223. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 214, at 764-65 (discussing the nonpublic
aspects of charter school operation).
224. See Ware & Robinson, supra note 120, at 2-3.
225. N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 2851(4)(e), 2852(9-a)(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2013).
226. North Carolina has a charter rule regulating its demographics, but the
state has failed to enforce it, leaving its charters no more reflective of
underlying demographics than any other state. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL.,
CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 31 (2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu
/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009

-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf.
227. Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation:All Things Are
Not Equal, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 107, 116-22 (2009).
228. One of the most consistent findings in educational social science
literature is the negative effect high-poverty schools have on achievement. See
id. at 118-19 (reviewing social science literature on this subject). There is little
reason to believe charters have the capacity to break this rule.
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reflect the community in which they reside would mean that a
charter school in a high-poverty, predominantly minority district
could not be diverse. To avoid this problem, enrollment rules should
create exceptions for charters that are affirmatively integrating.
Schools of these sorts, moreover, are not pipe dreams. Although
they are exceptions to the general rule, several high-performing,
highly diverse charters exist. 229 Equally important, they are often
in demand. 230 More schools of these sorts will be established if
states and the federal government weigh diversity as an important
factor in the application process and pay close attention to where
new charters are sited. 23 1 It also bears emphasizing that charters
actually have the potential to be more integrated than regular
public schools because charter schools do not have to restrict their
enrollment to neighborhoods where they are located and they have
far more flexibility than traditional public schools to draw students
from outside their district. 232
In all fairness, if charters were filling a service gap for students,
improving achievement, facilitating pedagogical experimentation
that would be used to benefit the larger system, or offering more
integration, skewed enrollment numbers might be tolerable under
some circumstances. Recognizing as much, charter proponents often
assert that they are, in fact, filling service gaps, improving

229. See Derek W. Black, Education's Elusive Future, Storied Past, and the
FundamentalInequities Between, 46 GA. L. REV. 557, 602 (2012).
230. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, DIVERSE CHARTER
SCHOOLS: CAN RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROMOTE BETTER
OUTCOMES FOR STUDENTS? 18-19 (2012), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf

/DiverseCharterSchoolsReport.pdf.
231. See NAT'L COAL. FOR
FEDERALLY

FUNDED

CHARTER

SCH.
DIVERSITY,
SHOULD
SCHOOLS

ISSUE BRIEF #2:
FOSTER DIVERSITY

at
http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf
(2010),
available
1-2
/DiversitylssueBriefNo2.pdf; Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 125, at
348-50.
232. Studies show that there is more segregation between districts than
within them. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 71 (2004) (estimating that sixty-nine percent of
segregation in metropolitan areas is due to segregation between districts); Sean
F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools:
The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1563, 1575-81 (2003) (discussing the gravity of interdistrict school segregation
Effective desegregation in
and its relationship to housing segregation).
metropolitan areas, in particular, would require students to attend schools
across district boundaries. Charters can more easily achieve this result than
traditional public schools. See generally JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A
WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATION
OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 287-90 (2010) (discussing the effectiveness of
intra- and interdistrict school choice plans). But see Wendy Parker, The

Failings of Education Reform and the Promise of Integration, 90 TEX. L. REV.
395, 412-13 (2011) (reviewing RYAN, supra).
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outcomes, and offering innovation. 233 But a combination of common
sense and evidence suggest charters overstate their case. First,
national data on charter school performance indicate that all but a
small percentage are doing no better educating students than
regular public schools. 234 Often charters are doing worse. 235 Thus,
charters on the whole are not bringing services, much less better
services, to students who did not already have them. Second, while
some individual charters may be innovative, they are not offering
the system innovation they promised. As Danielle Holley-Walker
argues, charters tend to operate in silos rather than as part of the
education system.236 Thus, most successful charters are successful
for their own sake, without playing a role in overall educational
improvement.
Yet, like their skewed enrollment numbers, these problems can
be fixed. A major step toward addressing quality failures in
charters is to be far more deliberate in granting charters, as opposed
to rushing to authorize as many as possible as quick as possible.2 37
Building quality schools is far more complicated than building
quality cars, and a failure in either is equally dangerous. Yet, the
past few years have been characterized by a potential willingness to
allow consumer and political demand for charters outpace quality
controls. 238 Quite simply, we must do the opposite; standards for
receiving a charter must be high and demand a strong basis in
evidence.

233. See Cindy Hunt, Senate Bill 100: Creating Public School Choice
Through CharterSchools, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 265, 266 (2000).
234. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER
45
(2009),
available at
PERFORMANCE
IN
16
STATES
SCHOOL

http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLECHOICECREDO.pdf; U.S.

DEP'T
OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FINAL
REPORT 53-57 (2004), available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/pcsp

-finallfinalreport.pdf; Erik W. Robelen, NAEP Gap Continuing for Charters:
Sector's Scores Lag in Three Out of Four Main Categories, EDUC. WK., May 21,
2008, at 1, 14. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: How TESTING AND
EDUCATION 138-44 (2010).
235. RAVITCH, supra note 234.

CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING

236. See Danielle Holley-Walker, Accountability Charter Schools, in OUR
255, 260
(Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009).
237. See generally David Nagel, CharterSchool Support Is a Prerequisitefor
Race to the Top Funds, JOURNAL (June 9, 2009), http://thejournal.com
/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-support-is-a-prerequisite-for-race-to-the-topfunds.aspx (quoting the Secretary of Education as stating that states that do
not "put artificial caps on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their
applications under the [$4.35 billion] Race to the Top Fund").
238. See, e.g., id.
PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL QUALITY FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN
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Of course, a high basis in evidence has the propensity to
strangle innovation, but charters, as a group, have not really proven
innovation in any event.239 To the extent charters are to expand
based on the theory of innovation, standards must likewise require
real innovation and that the innovation feed back into the overall
public school system. 240 Moving forward, public policy must be clear
as to whether the point of charter schools is more quality schools,
more innovation, or both, as each requires different specific
standards.
The next step in addressing quality and innovation is to
terminate or refuse to renew charters that are not living up to their
promises. 24 1 Data suggest this simply has not been the case. Of all
the charter schools created thus far, about fifteen percent have
closed, 242 but most of those closures are not a result of state's
holding charters to high standards. Rather, many of those closures
are a result of insufficient funding and mismanagement. 24 3
Moreover, the rate of charter school closure has been falling in
recent years. 244 Now, less than two percent of charters are closed
each year, and less than one percent are closed for academic
reasons.245 If the front-end standards for charter authorization are
strengthened these rates might be appropriate, but in their absence,
more back-end accountability is necessary.
The final major step in making charter schools fully public is
related to setting quality and innovations standards. All charter
schools, including those that are apparently successful, need
improved oversight. While charters are premised on more flexibility
than traditional schools, 246 flexibility cannot be the equivalent of
complete autonomy. The foregoing discussion focuses on the need to
ensure equity and inclusion in enrollment, but these failures are
239. Holley-Walker, supra note 236.
240. Id.
241. See generally NAT'L RES. CTR. ON CHARTER SCH. FIN.

& GOVERNANCE,

THROUGH

INTERVENTIONS

INCREASING

CHARTER

SCHOOL

ACCOUNTABILITY

AND CLOSURES (2010), available at www.financeproject.org/Publications
/IncreasingAccountability.pdf.
242.
WHAT

AND

THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS:
PERFORMANCE
WE
Do
NoT-ABouT
WHAT
WE KNOW-AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

6 (2011),

available at http://www.edreform.com/wp

-content/uploads/2011/12/StateOfCharterSchoolsCERDec2O 1-Web- 1.pdf
(detailing the closure of charter schools).
243. Id. at 8.
Closed
for
Rarely
Charter
Schools
Resmovits,
244. Joy
Academic

Performance:

Report,

HUFFINGTON

POST

(Dec.

21,

2011, 8:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/21/charter-schools
-closure_n_1164104.html.
245. Id.
246. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2074 (2002).

2013]

THE PUBLIC GOOD

487

oversight and process failures as much as mission failures. If
charter schools are to be public schools, they must operate like
them, which means acting in accordance with the host of
constitutional requirements and principles discussed earlier. 247 The
level of autonomy given to most charters suggests that they are not
accountable for anything other than the end result. 248 Due process,
equal protection, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment
all dictate that the process by which public schools teach students is
as important as anything else; how public schools treat students is
just as much a substantive lesson as is math. 249 Traditional public
schools are not perfect in all these respects, but they know they are
expected to be. Charters need sufficient oversight so that they
receive the same message.
If the foregoing issues are addressed, the possibility that
charters are perceived as, or can become, havens of flight from
public schools will be drastically diminished. Charters will not be
"opt outs" from the public school system. Rather, they will be
legitimate options that are fully within the public school system and
add to the collective good.
CONCLUSION

The goal of public policy in regard to charters, vouchers, and
any other type of privatization should be to shape these educational
options in ways that make it fair to call them public. Currently, the
accountability, mission, enrollment, and dissenting aspects of
charter schools call their public status into question and raise the
greatest concern given their rapid expansion. This need not be the
case. All of the nonpublic aspects of charters can easily be reined in.
The question is whether they can be reined in without also
sacrificing the unique aspects of charters that make them desirable
in the first place. The answer is yes, but it will take statutory
reforms, the likes of which proponents of the marketplace will
staunchly resist.
While the marketplace should not be the determinate factor of
the public good in education, in reality the marketplace has become
a major player. In this respect, our education system is truly at a
crossroads. The crossroads is not charters and vouchers versus
public schools but rather a fundamental crossroads of turning the
public good into a private good. Currently, public education still

247. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
248. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supranote 234, at 30-33.
249. For discussion about the lessons that students are taught in school that
are not purely academic, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 592-93 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1969).
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rests somewhere between these two poles, but it is drifting toward
the private good without specific recognition of this reality.
Vouchers and charters, as currently implemented, are symptoms of
this drift rather than the problem themselves.
Charters and vouchers are largely pedagogically empty vessels.
If appropriately structured, they can serve any end we wish. Hence,
their current flaws are practical ones. These flaws, however, are not
accidental. They are born out of the insistence that vouchers and
charters should be free from oversight or limitations, the implicit
message being that we should publicly fund individual market
ventures.
An understanding of education as a public good, however,
dictates that the public, not just the individual, receives a return on
And, while some students may
educational investments.
understandably be willing to gamble given the poor and unequal
opportunities we currently afford them, the public's future is not one
on which we can afford to gamble. We should redouble our
commitment to fully public schools, not run from them. Moreover, it
is only our gross failure in this commitment that makes nonpublic
options appear to be viable policy options.

